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An Analysis of Budget Deficits, Debt Accumulation, 
and Debt Instability1 
 
FAIZ BILQUEES 
 
In Pakistan all the macro indicators have been adversely affected by the persistently high deficits and 
the strategy adopted to finance them in the last two decades. The excessive domestic borrowing at high 
rates to finance deficits without any attempts at domestic resource mobilisation and controlling of the 
deficits over extended periods absorbed all available domestic and external resources.  The resulting debt-
trap led to increased external borrowings at high rates with short-term maturity.  This, coupled with 
massive exchange rate depreciation throughout the last two decades, resulted in rapid debt accumulation.  
The recent fiscal space created in the wake of events of 9/11, resulting in high reserves, follows 
considerable debt relief and availability of massive funds on very soft terms.  However, the decline in 
budget deficit continues to occur at the expense of development expenditure, along with some increase in 
tax revenues.  This trend in expenditure needs to be reversed if serious progress in debt reduction is the 
aim. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Appropriate management of the budget deficit is crucial for the stability of the economy 
and has been the major benchmark for the countries to join the Euro.  Continued high deficits tend 
to aggravate other macro indicators like interest rates, savings, investment, growth, current 
account deficit, etc. Since 1987-88, when Pakistan’s budget deficit increased sharply to 8.5 
percent of GDP, there has been a serious discussion between Pakistan and the multilateral 
institutions. Whereas in the 1990s the deficit was reduced to the range of 6 to 7 percent of GDP, it 
has been brought down to around 5 percent in recent years.  
High deficits in Pakistan have their origin in the complete neglect of domestic resource 
mobilisation.  In the face of rising public expenditures, excessive domestic and external borrowings 
piled up the public debt.  Furthermore, heavy reliance on non-inflationary but expensive non-bank 
borrowing, and the continued depreciation of the exchange rate, inflated the debt burden enormously.  
The growing deficits (the-revenue-minus-expenditure gap), coupled with low domestic resource 
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mobilisation, accentuated the savings-investment gap (S-I).  The strategy of expensive but non-
inflationary borrowing from the non-bank and external sources to finance both the development and 
non-development expenditures not only increased the domestic debt tremendously, it mortgaged the 
export earnings, thus widening the export-import gap (X-M).   
A significant aspect of the debt burden in Pakistan has been the policy of domestic 
borrowing at very high rates of returns.  Since the Government wanted to avoid inflationary 
tendencies, it focused, especially in the 1980s, on the non-bank borrowing.  The resulting increase 
in interest payments on domestic debt exceeded the interest payments on the external debt, which 
in turn accentuated the budget deficit.  
The objectives of this paper are: to test for the contribution of the various factors to the 
acceleration of debt burden over two decades (1980s and 1990s); and to trace the factors 
responsible for the high budget deficits and the resulting debt accumulation with respect to the 
trends in the three gaps.  The paper also focuses on the changing composition of the domestic and 
external debt with reference to the availability of financing as well as relative interest costs.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section II presents an overview of the impact of budget 
deficits by different schools of thought.  In Section III we look at the trends in the debt burden of 
Pakistan—both domestic and external over time, to assess the impact of interest rate–growth 
differential, the exchange rate depreciation effect, and the effect of budget deficits.  Factors 
responsible for the accumulation of public debt with respect to the three gaps are discussed in 
Section IV.  Section V is about the factors responsible for the changing composition of public 
debt; and finally, Section VI concludes the paper with some policy recommendations.  
 
II.  IMPACTS OF FISCAL DEFICIT: AN OVERVIEW 
In economic literature fiscal deficits have been regarded as good, bad, and irrelevant.  The 
Keynesians maintain that a reduction in taxes or an increase in public expenditure would stimulate 
aggregate demand. If there is excess capacity and unemployment, this would lead to higher 
income and output, and also have a positive effect on savings and investment. However, this 
argument is valid only if unemployment and excess capacity is due to demand limitations only.  
The Ricardians hold that fiscal deficits can be substituted for taxes without any impact on 
aggregate demand.  The households save more to pay higher future taxes if the government 
reduces current taxes without reducing current expenditure; national savings are independent of 
taxation.  The Ricardian paradigm is not very relevant in the case of a developing country like 
Pakistan because of its other equally stringent assumptions such as the existence of perfect capital 
markets, non-distortionary tax systems, fully rational and foresighted consumers, etc.    
The neoclassicals maintain that substitution of fiscal deficit for taxation leads to an 
expansion of aggregated demand.  Consequently, the desired private savings rise by less than the 
tax cuts, and hence the national savings decline.  It requires an increase in real interest rate to 
equate desired savings and desired investment.  However, the high interest rates crowd out private 
sector, resulting in lower investment in the long run. This, is turn, leads to higher deficits, 
requiring borrowing from abroad, which leads to current account deficits.  The current account 
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deficit in the long run shows up as low stock of national wealth, and higher claims by foreigners—
the debt burden.  
The continuous rise in deficits, the consequent rise in public debt, and the decline in 
investment coupled with the widening trade gap over an extended period, suggest that the impact 
of Pakistan’s fiscal deficits may be close to the neoclassical paradigm.  Furthermore, these also 
suggest that countries with high deficits may be facing three (not two) gaps: the S-I gap, the X-M 
gap, and the R-E gap.  
 
III.   DEBT BURDEN AND TRENDS IN COMPONENTS OF DEBT 
Persistent deficits financed through borrowings pile up the national debt.  It will be 
seen from Table 1 that Pakistan’s public debt increased from Rs 144.9 billion in 1980-81 to 
Rs 709 billion in 1989-90, and stood at Rs 3478.6 billion in 2002-03.     
While both the external and domestic debt have been rising, the latter has risen much faster; 
the foreign debt increased from Rs 86.7 billion in 1980-81 to Rs 324 billion in 1989-90, and to Rs 
1666.4 billion in 2002-03. Domestic debt increased from Rs 58 billion to Rs 381 billion and 
amounted to Rs 1812 billion over the three time-periods.  External debt as a percent of total debt 
declined over time from 60 percent in 1980-81 to 48 percent in 2002-03, while domestic debt 
increased from 40 percent to 52 percent over the same period. 
Macro variables affecting the change in the stock of public debt include the interest rates, 
the exchange rates, budget deficits, and GDP growth.  The impact of these factors on the growth of 
public debt in Pakistan over the two decades is assessed with respect to the interest rate–growth 
differential, the exchange rate changes, and the primary budget deficit.  The debt ratio rises when 
the real interest rate exceeds the real GDP growth, when the exchange rate depreciates, and when 
the primary budget is balanced or in deficit.  The debt dynamics equations for these three 
indicators are derived as follows:1 
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Table 1 
Trends in Domestic and Foreign Public Debt 
Rs Billion Percentage Share in Total Debt 
  Year 
Domestic 
Debt 
Foreign 
Debt 
Total 
Debt 
Domestic Foreign 
1980-81 58.1 86.7 144.9 40.10 59.90 
1981-82 81.3 87.2 168.5 48.27 51.73 
1982-83 104.2 118.3 222.6 46.82 53.18 
1983-84 124.2 127.6 252.5 48.50 51.50 
1984-85 153.0 147.4 300.5 50.93 49.07 
1985-86 203.1 179.2 382.4 53.12 46.88 
1986-87 248.5 206.4 454.9 54.62 45.38 
1987-88 290.1 227.3 517.5 56.06 43.94 
1988-89 333.2 272.3 605.9 54.99 45.01 
1989-90 381.3 323.6 704.9 54.09 45.91 
1990-91 448.2 346.9 795.0 56.37 43.63 
1991-92 531.5 431.8 963.3 55.18 44.82 
1992-93 615.3 494.8 111.0 55.43 44.57 
1993-94 711.0 612.9 132.9 53.71 46.29 
1994-95 807.7 683.1 149.1 54.17 45.83 
1995-96 920.3 748.3 1668.1 55.15 44.85 
1996-97 1056.1 878.1 1934.1 54.60 45.40 
1997-98 1199.7 986.9 2186.5 54.87 45.13 
1998-99 1452.3 1272.4 2724.7 53.31 46.69 
1999-00 1641.3 1312.8 2955.0 55.56 44.44 
2000-01 1788.2 1496.4 3292.6 54.64 45.36 
2001-02 1757.6 1671.7 3429.3 51.26 48.73 
2002-03 1812.2 1666.4 3478.6 52.08 47.89 
Source:  Pakistan Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
 
The stock of public debt at time t is given by: 
Bt  =  (1 + r )  Bt–1 – PD  =  ( 1 + r)  [BDt–1 + Et B$t–1] –  PDt 
Where 
 Bt = Public debt at time t in domestic currency. 
 BDt = Domestic public debt at time t in domestic currency. 
 BE $,t = External public debt at time t in U.S. dollars. 
 Et = Exchange rate at time t, domestic currency per U.S. dollars. 
 r = Average nominal interest rate on public debt. 
 PDt = Primary deficit at time t. 
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Scaling by nominal GDP (Yt), and letting lower-case letters denote share of GDP yields 
[ ] ttEttDt pdbbgrb −η++++= −− 1,1, )1()1( )1(  … … … (2) 
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Subtracting bt–1 from both sides and collecting terms finally yields: 
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This allows us to decompose the change in public debt as a percentage (share) of GDP into: 
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 Primary budget deficit effect: –pdt, the debt ratio increases when the primary budget is 
balanced or is in deficit. 
However, ∆b may also generate residuals the effect of which may be positive or negative. 
Estimates of these four effects of ∆b are reported in Table 2.  While Section 2a of the table gives 
estimates based on nominal interest rates and output, Section 2b of the table uses real interest and 
output growth.  However, the outcome on the four effects does not differ very significantly.  
The interest rate–growth differential would push the ∆b ratio up if real interest rate 
exceeded the real output. However, this effect is negative throughout the        two decades whether 
nominal or real interest rates and  output are used.  The primary  
 
 
 
… … … … (3)
interest rate exceeds real GDP,
exchange rate depreciates,
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Table 2 
Trends in Factors Affecting the Debt/GDP Ratios 
2a 2b 
  Year 
∆b Foreign 
Exchange 
Effect 
Primary 
Budget 
Deficit 
Nominal Interest 
–Nominal Growth 
Differencies 
Residual ∆b Foreign 
Exchange 
Effect 
Primary 
Budget 
Deficit 
Nominal Interest 
–Nominal Growth 
Differencies 
Residual 
1980-81   3.13      3.13   
1981-82 –0.002  2.93 –2.95 0.011 –0.003  2.93 –5.60 2.658 
1982-83 0.216 0.186 3.98 –5.67 1.716 0.228 0.196 3.98 –3.43 –0.526 
1983-84 0.043 0.045 2.62 –2.35 –0.277 0.040 0.043 2.62 –5.41 2.785 
1984-85 0.079 0.076 4.29 –2.84 –1.449 0.077 0.074 4.29 –3.99 –0.291 
1985-86 0.043 0.038 4.26 –2.40 –1.852 0.043 0.038 4.26 –2.32 –1.932 
1986-87 0.039 0.037 3.97 –3.54 –0.435 0.038 0.037 3.97 –4.18 0.209 
1987-88 0.010 0.012 3.60 –7.57 3.966 0.010 0.012 3.60 –8.07 4.465 
1988-89 0.040 0.039 2.44 –2.21 –0.228 0.038 0.038 2.44 –5.27 2.832 
1989-90 0.051 0.049 1.09 1.50 –2.594 0.047 0.046 1.09 –2.88 1.781 
1990-91 0.014 0.015 3.85 –6.93 3.081 0.013 0.015 3.85 –8.97 5.121 
1991-92 0.028 0.028 2.29 –5.90 3.614 0.027 0.028 2.29 –7.61 5.323 
1992-93 0.011 0.011 2.15 –4.70 2.544 0.012 0.012 2.15 –2.59 0.439 
1993-94 0.035 0.035 0.08 –7.28 7.193 0.035 0.035 0.08 –7.20 7.116 
1994-95 0.004 0.004 0.43 –8.80 8.366 0.004 0.004 0.43 –8.89 8.453 
1995-96 0.014 0.014 0.25 –6.14 5.892 0.014 0.014 0.25 –4.66 4.406 
1996-97 0.024 0.023 –0.19 0.00 0.188 0.022 0.022 –0.19 –4.49 4.678 
1997-98 0.015 0.015 0.10 0.00 –0.098 0.015 0.015 0.10 –0.19 0.096 
1998-99 0.012 0.011 –1.39 0.79 0.609 0.011 0.010 –1.39 –1.29 2.686 
1999-00 0.015 0.014 –1.60 0.87 0.731 0.015 0.014 –1.60 1.59 0.013 
2000-01 0.016 0.015 –1.78 –2.66 4.438 0.016 0.015 –1.78 –1.53 3.306 
2001-02 0.006 0.006 –1.70 0.92 0.778 0.006 0.006 –1.70 –0.01 1.702 
2002-03 –0.004 –0.005 –0.65 –3.18 3.829 –0.004 –0.005 –0.65 –3.18 3.829 
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budget deficit is an important factor affecting the budget deficits because government 
consumption exceeds government revenues for almost all the periods except for very early 1980s.  
Since primary budget is in deficit between 1980-81 and 1995-96, it leads to higher ∆b.  In the 
remaining period it is in surplus except for 1997-98, and hence has a dampening effect. The 
foreign exchange effect is the strongest effect pulling up the debt ratio.  In fact it equals the ∆b for 
a number of years, (1988-99, 1992-93 to 1997-98, and 2001-02), and even exceeds the debt ratio 
in some cases.  In case of the residual effect, we do not know for certain what these residuals are, 
but it appears from Table 2 that the positive savings of the government and the remittances may be 
exerting a negative effect on the debt ratio in the early Eighties. However, for the remaining period 
they bear a positive sign.  In Table 2b, however, the negative effect of residuals on the debt ratio 
extends from 1983-84 to 1989-90, excluding 1987-88, and again in 1995-96 they bear a negative 
sign.  This may be due to some privatisation proceeds accruing from the sale of shares of the 
Pakistan International Airlines in the late Eighties.  However, the positive effect is considerably 
higher in the 1990s to 2002 period than the negative effect of the 1980s. Since the exchange rate 
depreciation in the later period has been quite rapid and significant, the positive effects of the 
residuals may be attributed to the exchange rate effect. 
The impact of changes in exchange rates on the growth of debt are also analysed in Table 
3 by comparing foreign debt in rupee terms at the annual prevailing exchange rates, and at the 
constant rate of 1980-81. Foreign debt at the prevailing exchange rates increased from 29 
percent of GNP in 1980-81 to 48 percent in 2000-01.  When calculated at the constant rate of Rs 
9.9/$, it would actually have declined to 15 percent in 1989-90.  Beyond 1995-96, it would be in 
single digit, and was 7.5 percent of GNP in 2000-01.  In the 1990s the foreign debt at the 
prevailing exchange rates is twice the size of the debt at constant rates during the period from 
1989-90 to 1995-96; three times in the following two years; and greater than five times in the 
last five years. The gap continues to widen, and in the last three years the debt at prevailing 
exchange rates is more than five times the debt at constant exchange rate. 
 However, this fixed exchange rate scenario is not very plausible since after 1981-82 
no debt was contracted at the same exchange rate. Similarly, all the cumulative debt over the 
year was not contracted at the new exchange rate.  Therefore, we estimate the impact of 
exchange rate on debt by adjusting the foreign debt only for the difference in the previous and 
current cumulative debt as shown in Column 5 of Table 4. This difference is multiplied with 
the prevailing exchange rate at which the new loan is actually contracted in a particular year 
and added to the previous year’s total as shown in Table 4, Column 6.  
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Table 3 
The Impact of Changes in Exchange Rate on the Foreign Debt 
 Year  
Foreign Debt 
($ Million) 
Exchange 
Rate 
Foreign Debt at 
Prevailing 
Exch. Rate 
(Rs Million) 
Foreign  
Debt at 
Rs 9.9 to a $ 
(Rs Million) 
Impact of 
Exchange 
Rate 
Changes on 
Foreign Debt 
1980-81  8765 9.90 86773.5 86773.5 0.00 
1981-82  8799 9.91 87198.1 87110.1 87.99 
1982-83  9312 12.71 118355.5 92188.8 26166.72 
1983-84  9469 13.48 127642.1 93743.1 33899.02 
1984-85  9732 15.15 147439.8 96346.8 5193.00 
1985-86  11108 16.14 179283.1 109969.2 69313.92 
1986-87  12023 17.17 206434.9 119027.7 87407.21 
1987-88  12913 17.61 227397.9 127838.7 99559.23 
1988-89  14190 19.22 272731.8 140481.0 132250.80 
1989-90  15094 21.44 323615.4 149430.6 174184.76 
1990-91  15471 22.42 346859.8 153162.9 193696.92 
1991-92  17361 24.87 431768.1 171873.9 259894.17 
1992-93  19044 25.98 494763.1 188535.6 306227.52 
1993-94  20322 30.16 612911.5 201187.8 411723.72 
1994-95  22117 30.89 683194.1 218958.3 464235.83 
1995-96  22292 33.57 748342.4 220690.8 527651.64 
1996-97  22509 39.01 878076.1 222839.1 655236.99 
1997-98  22844 43.20 986860.8 226155.6 760705.20 
1998-99  25423 50.05 1272421.2 251687.7 1020733.45 
1999-00  25359 51.77 1312835.4 251054.1 1061781.33 
2000-01  25555 51.44 1493434.0 252994.5 1240439.50 
2001-02  27215 61.42 1671545.0 269428.5 1402117.00 
2002-03  28365 58.75 166644.4 280813.5 1385630.00 
Source:  Estimated from Pakistan Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
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Table 4 
Impact of Exchange Rate Changes on Debt 
  Year  
Foreign 
Debt 
($ Million) 
Exchange 
Rate 
Foreign 
Debt at 
Prevailing 
Exch. Rate 
(Rs Million) 
Changes 
in 
Foreign 
Debt  
($ Million) 
External Debt at the 
Exchange Rate at 
which 
the New Loan was 
Contracted 
Impact of 
Exchange 
Rate Deprecia-
tion 
on Foreign  Debt 
1980-81  8765 9.90 86773.5 107.0 86773.50 0.0 
1981-82  8799 9.91 87198.1 34.0 87110.4 88.0 
1982-83  9312 12.71 118355.5 513.0 93630.63 24725.0 
1983-84  9469 13.48 127642.1 157.0 95746.99 31895.0 
1984-85  9732 15.15 147439.8 263.0 99731.44 47709.0 
1985-86  11108 16.14 179283.1 1376.0 121940.08 57343.0 
1986-87  12023 17.17 206434.9 915.0 137650.63 68784.0 
1987-88  12913 17.61 227397.9 890.0 153323.53 74074.0 
1988-89  14190 19.22 272731.8 1277.0 177867.47 94865.0 
1989-90  15094 21.44 323615.4 904.0 197249.23 126366.0 
1990-91  15471 22.42 346859.8 377.0 205701.57 141159.0 
1991-92  17361 24.87 431768.1 1890.0 252705.87 179062.0 
1992-93  19044 25.98 494763.1 1683.0 296430.21 198332.9 
1993-94  20322 30.16 612911.5 1278.0 334974.40 277937.0 
1994-95  2217 30.89 683194.1 1795.0 390422.24 292772.0 
1995-96  22292 33.57 748342.4 175.0 396296.92 352045.0 
1996-97  22509 39.01 878076.1 217.0 404762.16 473314.0 
1997-98  22844 43.20 986860.8 335.0 419234.16 567627.0 
1998-99  25423 50.05 1272421.2 2579.0 548313.11 724108.0 
1999-00  25359 51.77 1312835.4 64.0 544999.77 767836.0 
2000-01  25555 58.44 1493434.0 132.0 552713.80 940720.0 
2001-02  27215 61.42 1671545.0 1660.0 654671.10 1016874.0 
2002-03  28365 58.75 1666444.0 1150.0 722233.60 944210.0 
Source:  Estimated from Pakistan Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
 
Although the impact of exchange rate in Table 4 is considerably less with this 
adjustment, yet it is still very significant particularly in the late Nineties. The adjusted change in 
the exchange rate accounts for 39 percent foreign debt in 1989-90 and 63 percent in 2000-01, as 
compared to 53 and 83 percent with non-adjusted exchange rate over the two periods.  This shows 
that the decline in foreign debt in the later years as shown in Table 1 is absorbed by the 
depreciation of the exchange rate, and the total public debt increases. 
 
IV.  BUDGET DEFICITS AND  DEBT ACCUMULATION 
The impact of continuously rising budget deficits on public debt in Pakistan can be 
explained with reference to the three-gap model: the revenue–expenditure (R-E) gap; the saving–
investment (S-I) gap; and the trade (X-M) gap. The revenue-expenditure gap of the last two 
decades has its origins in the complete neglect of domestic resource mobilisation of the earlier 
periods due to the easy availability of cheaper external resources and flow of remittances from the 
Middle East.  The trends in government revenues are reported in Table 5.  
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Table 5 
Gross Net Revenues of the Government 
                                                                                                                            (Percent of GDP) 
  
  Year 
Total 
Govern-
ment 
Revenue 
Tax 
Revenue 
Non-tax 
Revenue 
Transfers 
from 
Govern-
ment 
Net 
Income 
Transfer to
Govern-
ment 
Private 
Disposable
Income 
Private 
Con-
sumption 
Private 
Con-
sumption 
Ratio 
1980-81 17.7 14.0 3.7 3.3 14.4 93.8 82.6 88.1 
1981-82 16.6 13.3 3.3 3.5 13.1 94.7 81.3 85.9 
1982-83 16.9 13.5 3.4 4.4 12.5 98.4 80.1 81.5 
1983-84 17.8 12.8 5.1 4.7 13.2 96.3 80.2 83.3 
1984-85 17.0 11.9 5.1 6.5 10.5 97.6 81.6 83.6 
1985-86 18.0 12.3 5.8 6.9 11.2 96.8 76.3 78.8 
1986-87 15.6 12.3 3.4 4.7 11.0 79.2 61.5 77.7 
1987-88 15.9 12.1 3.8 5.5 10.4 81.1 63.2 77.9 
1988-89 16.9 12.9 4.0 6.5 10.4 82.8 63.5 76.6 
1989-90 16.2 11.7 4.5 5.8 10.4 77.1 59.9 77.7 
1990-91 14.2 10.7 3.5 5.0 9.2 77.0 57.6 74.8 
1991-92 17.3 12.2 5.0 5.6 11.6 79.6 62.9 79.0 
1992-93 15.3 11.3 4.0 5.7 9.6 76.3 61.2 80.2 
1993-94 14.5 11.1 3.4 5.6 8.9 74.9 59.0 78.7 
1994-95 17.0 13.6 3.4 5.8 11.2 88.8 71.3 80.3 
1995-96 17.8 14.3 3.5 6.7 11.0 88.6 72.1 81.4 
1996-97 15.6 13.2 2.4 6.9 8.8 90.5 74.0 81.8 
1997-98 16.0 13.2 2.8 8.0 8.1 91.0 72.1 79.2 
1998-99 15.9 13.3 2.7 8.1 7.9 91.3 75.7 82.9 
1999-00 17.1 12.9 3.4 9.2 7.9 90.7 74.4 82.1 
2000-01 16.7 12.9 3.3 8.0 8.7 89.8 75.0 83.5 
2001-02 17.2 13.2 4.0 8.0 9.2 83.5 74.4 89.0 
Source:  Based on Appendix Table 1. 
 
In Table 5 the conventional estimates of the total government revenues have been adjusted for 
the “Transfers from the Government” to arrive at net revenues.  This adjustment is necessitated in 
view of the fact that all government expenditures are not discretionary. In Table 6 government 
expenditures are disaggregated into discretionary (non-obligatory) and non-discretionary 
(obligatory) expenditures.  The former are classified as current expenditures, and the latter as 
government consumption. Expenditures under the head “Government Consumption” are netted out 
of the total government revenues.  This is essential because we know that these are compulsory non-
discretionary entities and must be paid out, while in the case of current expenditures the government 
can use its discretion to postpone or delay expenses on any head in the face of a revenue constraint. 
It can be seen from Table 5 that during the first half of the Eighties, transfers from the government 
almost doubled from 3.3 percent in 1980-81 to 6.5 percent in 1984-85, and averaged 6 percent in the 
second half of the Eighties and the first half of the Nineties.  However, in the second half of the 
Nineties, they increased more rapidly from 7 percent to 9 percent during the period from 1995-96 to 
1999-00, and averaged 8 percent in the last two years of the period.   
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Table 6 
Government Expenditures 
(Rs Million) 
  1980-81 1982-83 1984-85 1986-87 1988-89 1990-91 1992-93 1994-95 1996-97 1998-99 2000-01 2001-02 
Current Expenditures  38079  61958  92490  113398  162485  192660  276725  345482  340157  549183  630712  651126 
General Administration  2873  4079  6518  7784  12343  13571  19603  31627  41995  38679  79690  85082 
Defence  15300  24566  31886  38899  51053  63273  87461  100221  12744  143471  131637  151669 
Law and Order  2031  2810  4087  5533  7225  8902  13619  20098  21707  24864  30836  34065+ 
Community Services  1422  2100  3013  4354  5097  5356  8404  10327  12416  14019  15161  16147 
Social Services  4904  7085  10292  16222  21901  27340  37332  51097  56729  63713  71336  77860 
Economic Services  2243  5199  6110  7682  8637  12029  13853  15586  19109  19944  25571  27966 
Unallocables  129  26  93  1312  773  1945  6955  6267  6385  7007  2768  2090 
Government Consumption  28902  45865  61999  81786  107029  132416  187227  235223  171085  311697  356999  360814 
Current Subsidies  2449  2799  5360  5809  13277  10712  7269  6452  11920  15035  29028  30895 
Grants to Provinces  1297  2644  9095  2613  4654  822  3552  2756  2098  9192  8645  8803 
Domestic Interest  3152  6276  10173  15817  28093  35710  62733  77865  126532  175273  185511  189477 
Foreign Interest  2279  4374  5863  7373  9432  13000  15944  23186  28522  37986  50529  61137 
Current Transfers  9177  16093  30491  31612  55456  60244  89498  110259  169072  237486  273713  290312 
Capital Expenditures  30820  51149  57192  76186  95106  119065  167060  265990  320385  392253  304703  395691 
Annual Development Plan  26137  28354  32653  42815  48000  83112  119890  153712  139744  152707  150325  130000 
Development Expenditure  23658  26374  31152  40635  46830  81888  119298  153665  0  0  0  
Development Subsidies  2479  1980  1501  2180  1170  1224  592  47  0  0  0  
Loans and Investment  1976  2461  1706  2260  4407  5767  7558  11498  12418  19441  15300  9385 
Others  100  149  469  711  3860  2490  2318  0  –3188  –1425  22  30 
Domestic Debt Amortisation  1453  13431  14834  20793  21673  5405  8821  40486  70784  98551  51120  91371 
Foreign Debt Amortisation  3633  8734  9031  11787  18336  23515  29065  60341  100627  122979  87936  164905 
Total Government Expenditures  68899 113107  149682  189584  257591  311725  443785  611472  660542  941436  935415 1046817 
Source: Compiled from Pakistan Economic Survey; Statistical Year Book of Pakistan;  and Annual Budget 
Statement (Various Issues). 
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Total government expenditures during this period averaged 22 percent of GDP despite the sharp 
decline in development expenditures from 6.3 percent to 3.5 percent. It is interesting to note that current 
subsidies always rising before and after the SAPs declined significantly during the programme period 
(Table 6).   However, the most rapid and significant increase in current transfers has mainly been due to 
the interest payments on domestic debt.  Interest payments on external debt increased sharply in the 
Nineties, but always remained significantly lower than the domestic debt payments.  As a result of 
these increases in the obligatory current transfers, the net income transfer to the government was 
significantly lower than the conventional estimates of total revenues, as shown in Table 5.  Total 
revenues amounting to 17.7 percent of GDP in 1980-81 were reduced to 14.4 percent when adjusted for 
transfers as shown in Columns 2 and 6 of Table 5.  However, this decline was more gradual in the 
Eighties as compared to the Nineties.  In fact, the net income of the government became single digit 
after 1995-96. On the other hand, government consumption (total current expenditures less current 
transfers) increased from 10 percent to 15 percent during 1980-81 to 1988-89, but declined to 10 
percent by 1993-94. It averaged 12  percent in the following four years, and declined further to around 
10 percent (Table 7). Overall, the increasing government consumption was matched by a higher net 
income of the government only in the first four years; beyond 1983-84 it exceeded the net income. As a 
result, public savings, which were positive with a declining trend in the first four years, became negative 
for the remaining period. Increased government consumption and/or increased investment with 
declining and negative savings were responsible for the continued widening of the S-I gap.  This gap 
has serious implications for the revenue–expenditure gap and the trade gap.  
The negative public savings and the positive but insufficient private savings resulted in the 
use of all available external resources to finance the budget deficits as shown in the last Column of 
Table 7.  External resources in excess of 5 percent were used in 1981-82, 1984-85, 1992-93, 1995-
96, and 1996-97. Debt servicing as a percentage of foreign exchange earnings during the Eighties 
increased from 20.4 percent in 1980-81 to 31.6 percent in 1984-85, and averaged 27 percent in the 
next five years.  Similarly, it increased as a percentage of foreign exchange earnings from 10.6 
percent in 1980-81 to 15.6 percent in 1986-87.  During the Nineties it averaged around 18 percent 
[see Pakistan Economic Survey (2002-03)].  
 
V.  CHANGING COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC DEBT 
It will be seen from Table 1 that domestic debt was less than 50 percent of the total debt 
until 1983-84, when public savings were positive (Table 7).  It increased from 51 percent in 1984-
85 to 56 percent in 1990-91, and fluctuated between 53 percent to 56 percent until 2002-03.  
Overall, it exceeded the foreign debt by 13 percent during the period from 1980-81 to 2002-03.  
One major factor responsible for this increase in domestic debt was the limited availability of external 
resources in the Eighties due  to excessive borrowings in the earlier periods.  Pakistan  borrowed  
heavily 
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Table 7 
Investment, Savings and Borrowings 
Government Sector Non-Government Sector Govt.+ 
  Year 
Net Income 
Transfer to 
Government 
Government 
Consump-
tion 
Government 
Savings 
Government
Investment 
Net 
Lending/ 
Borrowing 
Private 
Disposable 
Income 
Private 
Consump- 
tion 
Private 
Savings 
Develop- 
ment 
Sudsidies 
Private 
Investment 
Net Lend- 
ing/ Borro- 
wing 
Non-govt. 
Net 
Borrowing 
= CAB 
1980-81 14.4 10.4 4.0 8.5 –4.1 93.8 82.6 11.1 0.9 10.7 0.4 –3.6 
1981-82 13.1 10.3 2.8 7.9 –4.7 94.7 81.3 13.4 0.6 13.7 –0.3 –5.0 
1982-83 12.5 11.4 1.0 7.2 –5.5 98.4 80.1 18.2 0.5 14.6 3.7 –1.8 
1983-84 13.2 12.1 1.1 6.4 –5.0 96.3 80.2 16.0 0.3 14.3 1.8 –3.2 
1984-85 10.5 12.1 –1.6 6.6 –6.3 97.6 81.6 16.0 0.3 15.1 0.9 –5.4 
1985-86 11.2 12.8 –1.6 7.1 –6.6 96.8 76.3 20.6 0.5 17.8 2.8 –3.9 
1986-87 11.0 11.5 –0.5 6.0 –6.1 79.2 61.5 17.6 0.2 13.3 4.3 –1.8 
1987-88 10.4 13.6 –3.2 5.8 –8.5 81.1 63.2 17.9 0.3 13.2 4.7 –3.8 
1988-89 10.4 15.1 –4.7 5.5 –9.6 82.8 63.5 19.3 0.3 14.0 5.3 –4.3 
1989-90 10.4 12.7 –2.3 5.5 –7.5 77.1 59.9 17.2 0.1 13.6 3.6 –4.0 
1990-91 9.2 12.0 –2.8 6.8 –9.5 77.0 57.6 19.4 0.1 14.0 5.5 –4.0 
1991-92 11.6 11.6 0.0 6.8 –6.6 79.6 62.9 16.7 0.1 12.8 3.8 –2.8 
1992-93 9.6 11.1 –1.5 7.6 –8.8 76.3 61.2 15.1 0.1 12.4 2.7 –6.1 
1993-94 8.9 10.0 –1.2 7.3 –8.3 74.9 59.0 16.0 0.0 10.8 5.1 –3.1 
1994-95 11.2 11.6 –0.3 8.1 –8.3 88.8 71.3 17.5 0.0 13.3 4.3 –4.0 
1995-96 11.0 12.5 –1.5 8.1 –9.5 88.6 72.1 16.5 0.0 14.2 2.3 –7.2 
1996-97 8.8 11.8 –3.0 5.7 –8.6 90.5 74.0 16.5 0.0 13.9 2.5 –6.1 
1997-98 8.1 11.3 –3.2 5.3 8.2 91.0 72.1 19.0 0.0 20.1 –11.2 –3.1 
1998-99 7.9 10.4 –2.5 5.2 –7.4 91.3 75.7 15.6 0.0 12.1 3.5 –3.9 
1999-00 7.7 11.2 –3.5 4.7 –7.9 90.7 74.4 16.3 0.0 10.2 6.0 –1.9 
2000-01 8.6 10.2 –1.6 4.4 –6.9 89.8 75.0 14.8 0.0 9.9 4.9 –2.0 
2001-02 9.2 11.3 –2.1 4.8 –6.9 83.5 74.4 9.2   8.3 5.3 –1.6 
Source:  Based on Appendix Table 2. 
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both at low rates with longer maturity and at high rates with low maturity, ending up in a debt-trap 
in the late Eighties and Nineties. Secondly, domestic borrowings, mainly from the non-bank debt 
sources under the National Savings Schemes (NSS), were used excessively to finance the budget 
deficits because they were non-inflationary.  Compared to the banking sector, deposits in the non-
bank sector earned very high rates of return, and a wide range of instruments with varied returns 
and maturities were available. Furthermore, these deposits are fixed in terms of returns, while in 
the case of bank deposits the investors and banks have to share the profit and loss equally.  
Finally, almost all the profits of NSS are exempt from tax, as shown in Table 8.   
 
Table 8 
Nominal Rates of Returns of Non-bank Debt Instruments and Commercial Banks 
National Savings Schemes 
Defence Saving Certificate* 
(Maturity Period) 
Mahana Amadni***
Accounts** 
Commercial Bank Fixed 
Deposit (Maturity Period)
  
  
  
  
  
1 
Years 
3 
Years 
5 
Years 
7 
Years 
10 
Years 
National 
Deposit 
Certificate 
Khas 
Deposit 
Certificate
1 
Years 
5 
Years 
1 
Years 
3 
Years
5 & above
Years 
1988-89 12.0 12.6 13.5 15.4 15.6 14.6 13.4 12.0 14.0 7.3 10.1 12.3 
1998-99 14.5 15.2 15.8 16.7 180.0 13.0 13.0 12.0 14.9 5.7 6.7 8.0 
1999-00 12.0 14.5 14.9 15.3 16.0 seized seized 12.0 14.9 5.4 6.3 8.9 
2002-03 7.0 – – – 11.6   7.0 8.5 4.8 5.7 8.1 
Source:  National Directorate of Savings (1999-2000), Islamabad. 
   Note:  *Non-taxable until 2000. 
         **Taxable in instalment. 
 ***Mahana Amadni is monthly return on savings. 
 
 The bias in favour of the non-bank finances at the expense of the banking sector is also 
reflected in the comparison between the real rates of returns on NSS deposits and the commercial 
banks (Table 9).  
The real rates of return on commercial banks’ one-year maturity deposits were largely 
positive in the Eighties with the exception of 1980-81 and 1988-89.  The situation is reversed in the 
Nineties because they are positive only for one year, 1999-00, and are equal to the inflation rate in 
2000-01. However, the rates are negative for the deposits of 5 years and above maturity for only 
three years in the Nineties—1990-91, 1993-94, and 1996-97.  In fact, the rates of return on 
commercial banks’ longest maturity deposits move fairly close to the National Savings Schemes’ 
shortest maturity deposits of the Defence Saving Certificates (DSCs) in the last three years. The 
coefficient of correlation between these two series is 0.67.  The DSCs long-maturity deposits are 
positive throughout the two decades despite the periodic revision of the rates and its linking with the 
returns on the Pakistan Investment Bond.  The impact of this most adverse term structure is reflected 
in the sharp increase in the share of domestic debt as a percentage of total debt, as shown in Table 1. 
The use of non-bank debt instruments to finance the deficits was preferred because it remained 
outside   the  purview  of   the  conditionality  of  the  SAPs;  it was available  on  tap,  there  
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Table 9 
Real Rates of Interest 
Commercial Banks 
Defence Saving 
Certificate 
  
   Year 
 
Inflation Rate 
1 Year - 
Maturity 
5 Year- 
Maturity 
1 Year - 
Maturity 
10 Year- 
Maturity 
1980-81 – – – – – 
1981-82 11.10 –0.80 1.30 0.90 4.50 
1982-83 4.70 5.80 7.70 7.30 10.90 
1983-84 7.30 3.20 5.20 4.70 8.30 
1984-85 5.70 4.70 6.70 6.30 9.90 
1985-86 4.40 5.00 7.60 7.60 11.20 
1986-87 3.60 4.80 8.60 8.40 12.00 
1987-88 6.30 1.80 5.80 5.70 9.30 
1988-89 10.40 –3.10 1.90 1.60 5.20 
1989-90 6.00 2.40 5.50 6.00 9.60 
1990-91 12.70 –5.80 –1.50 –0.70 2.90 
1991-92 10.87 –4.50 2.20 2.40 6.00 
1992-93 8.67 –4.30 2.10 2.70 6.30 
1993-94 12.86 –5.30 –0.30 1.80 4.80 
1994-95 16.16 –8.90 –3.10 –1.70 1.29 
1995-96 8.04 –4.30 0.60 2.20 5.19 
1996-97 11.13 –5.20 –1.60 2.70 6.24 
1997-98 7.80 –0.20 1.20 6.70 10.24 
1998-99 5.70 –0.30 3.20 8.80 10.27 
1999-00 3.85 1.55 5.05 5.15 10.16 
2000-01 5.40 0.00 4.20 4.60 9.41 
2001-02 4.90 –0.10 3.20 4.60 9.40 
Source:  Pakistan Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
 
was no legislation to prevent its excessive use, and it was non-inflationary.  However, the 
successive governments chose to ignore its negative consequences.  It enabled the rich to benefit 
most from the NSS that were meant to benefit the small savers, resulting in rapid and massive debt 
accumulation.  At the same time, it created serious distortions in the term structure of interest 
rates, with serious implications for the banking industry and the potential investors. 
 
VI.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Accumulation of budget deficits and the resulting public debt in Pakistan has its origins in 
the early neglect of domestic resource mobilisation.  This deficit-debt scenario conforms to the 
neo-classical paradigm whereby the revenue-expenditure constraint impacts both the S-I and the 
X-M gaps. The change in the debt-to-GDP ratio is accounted for by the interest rate-growth 
differential, the foreign exchange effect, and the primary budget deficit.  The primary deficits are 
responsible for higher budget deficits, which due to higher government consumption compared to 
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its resources leads to higher domestic as well as external borrowings. Excessive external 
borrowing with limited repayment capacity results in exchange rate depreciation, and 
consequently the exchange rate exerts a very strong effect on the debt ratio.  Primary budget 
deficits also exert a positive effect on the debt ratio. However, after mid- Nineties the primary 
budget is surplus.  The interest-growth differential does not affect the debt ratio because the 
interest rates, both nominal and real, have always been controlled and hence remained lower than 
the growth rate. The residuals exert both positive and negative effects on the ratio, but it is not 
certain what these residuals are.  The high and positive values of the residuals in the period 
between mid-Nineties to 2002-03 suggest that they may represent variables related to the 
exchange rate effects, such as the impact of freezing of the foreign currency accounts in the late 
Nineties, and floating of the currency during 2002-03.  Trends in public and private consumption 
reveal an outflow of capital largely due to the rapid loss of the value of Pakistani currency.  
Furthermore, the inconsistency of the investment and trade policies and the deterioration in the 
law and order situation also fuelled this outflow. 
The policy of non-bank financing of the budget deficits, to avoid conditionality on the bank 
finance, led to the accumulation of short-term domestic debt and at the same-time diverted private 
resources away from investment to the non-bank instruments or abroad.  Moreover, this policy led 
to distortions in the term structure of interest rates with serious consequences for the banking 
industry—and its negative ramifications for investment and the economy as a whole. 
Ignoring the positive fallout of the events of 9/11 on some of the macro indicators without 
any corresponding positive impact on the micro indicators, which would have led to some decline 
in poverty, the present situation is not viable for long. The decline in the budget deficit to 4.4 
percent in 2002-03 was made possible to some extent by the rise in tax revenues, but at the same 
time the fall in the development expenditures was disappointing.  Despite the improvement in the 
fiscal sector, Pakistan still remains heavily burdened by the debt incurred in the past, and therefore 
needs to generate sustained primary surpluses for the coming years.  The economy’s ability to 
carry debt needs to be improved through acceleration in the developmental expenditures and a 
reduction in the current expenditures. In other words, it requires the elements of “proper fiscal 
governance” to be put in place.  This involves clearly laid out rules and procedures for 
coordination between the Ministries of Commerce and Industry and the Central Board of Revenue 
to encourage investment and exports, leading to improved revenue generation. The policy of 
rationalisation of rates of return between the bank and non-bank finance is a step in the right 
direction, and therefore must be pursued further. Equalisation of the rates of return between the 
bank and non-bank sectors would lead to a flow of funds into the banking sector and into 
productive investments either directly or through the stock markets. Taking the non-bank finance 
off the tap would also help reduce the dependence on this source; it is also essential to put the 
banking industry on a sound footing. Decline in the budget deficits and debt in the backdrop of 
9/11 must be considered a one-time opportunity to overcome the deficit-debt-trap, and serious 
efforts should be made to prevent a repeat of this situation.  
 
Appendices 
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Appendix 1 
Private Disposable Income and Consumption Ratio 
   Year 
Govt. 
Revenue 
Tax- 
Revenue 
Non-tax 
Revenue 
Transfers 
from 
Govt. 
Net 
Income 
Transfers 
to Govt. 
Private 
Disposable
Income 
Private 
Consump- 
tion 
Private 
Consump- 
tion Ratio 
1980-81  49201  38846  10175  9177  40024  260864  229879 88.1 
1981-82  53839  43003  10836  11343  42496  307012  263658 85.9 
1982-83  61467  49029  12438  16093  45374  358408  291942 81.5 
1983-84  74855  53646  21209  19573  55282  404115  336747 83.3 
1984-85  80042  55963  24079  30491  49551  460917  385346 83.6 
1985-86  92819  63083  29736  35246  57573  498318  392532 78.8 
1986-87  105692  82927  22765  31612  74080  534777  415674 77.7 
1987-88  122352  92998  29354  42131  80221  624263  486565 77.9 
1988-89  144297  110338  33959  55456  88841  708909  543297 76.6 
1989-90  165585  119435  46150  59312  106273  786570  611015 77.7 
1990-91  171777  129640  42137  60244  111533  932975  697448 74.8 
1991-92  231503  164307  67196  75315  156188  1067734  843939 79.0 
1992-93  241128  178391  62737  89498  151630  1199959  962419 80.2 
1993-94  272734  208410  64324  105841  166893  1410192  1109980 78.7 
1994-95  322932  257892  65040  110259  212673  1683441  1351371 80.3 
1995-96  380260  305580  74680  144154  236106  1898600  1545228 81.4 
1996-97  384331  324641  59689  169072  215259  2222772  1818213 81.8 
1997-98  429454  354754  74700  213300  216154  2437138  1929702 79.2 
1998-99  468601  390726  77875  237486  231115  2681717  2223998 82.9 
1999-00  536832  405824  106900  288844  247988  2854273  2342417 82.1 
2000-01  570600  441600  111400  273713  296887  3075484  2567321 83.5 
2001-02  624100  478100  146000  290312  333788  3031634  2698992 89.0 
Source: Estimated from Pakistan Economic Survey and the Annual Reports of the State Bank of Pakistan (Various Issues). 
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Appendix 2 
Investment, Savings and Borrowings 
   Year 
Net Income 
Transfer to 
Government 
Government 
Consump- 
tion 
Government 
Savings 
Government
Investment 
Net Lend- 
ing/Borro- 
wing 
Private 
Disposable 
Income 
Private 
Consump- 
tion 
Private 
Savings 
Private 
Investment 
Net Lend- 
ing/Borro- 
wing 
Govt.+ 
Non-govt 
Net 
Borrowing 
1980-81  40024  28939  11085  23658  –11276  260864  229879  30985  29846  1139  –10137 
1981-82  42496  33522  8974  25767  –15217  307012  263658  43354  44330  –976  –16193 
1982-83  45374  41606  3768  26374  –19962  358408  291942  66466  53019  13447  –6515 
1983-84  55282  50741  4541  26747  –20892  404115  336747  67368  59957  7411  –13481 
1984-85  49551  57126  –7575  31152  –29632  460917  385346  75571  71408  4163  –25469 
1985-86  57573  65662  –8089  36548  –34116  498318  392532  105786  91607  14179  –19937 
1986-87  74080  77482  –3402  40635  –41424  534777  415674  119103  90024  29079  –12345 
1987-88  80221  104754  –24533  44376  –65507  624263  486565  137698  101793  35905  –29602 
1988-89  88841  129201  –40360  46830  –82536  708909  543297  165612  120248  45364  –37172 
1989-90  106273  129562  –23289  56482  –76866  786570  611015  175555  139251  36304  –40562 
1990-91  111533  145575  –34042  81888  –115108  932975  697448  235527  169093  66434  –48674 
1991-92  156188  155567  621  91354  –88685  1067734  843939  223795  172360  51435  –37250 
1992-93  151630  174680  –23050  119298  –138796  1199959  962419  237540  194472  43068  –95728 
1993-94  166893  189102  –22209  137073  –155690  1410192  1109980  300212  203794  96418  –59272 
1994-95  212673  219125  –6452  153665  –157361  1683441  1351371  332070  251345  80725  –76636 
1995-96  236106  268098  –31992  172816  –202466  1898600  1545228  353372  304481  48891  –153575 
1996-97  215259  288813  –73554  139744  –211200  2222772  1818213  404559  342419  62140  –149060 
1997-98  216154  301614  –85460  141495  218746  2437138  1929702  507436  538781  –300693  –81947 
1998-99  231115  304419  –73304  152707  –216819  2681717  2223998  457719  354554  103165  –113654 
1999-00  242298  351303  –109005  148767  –248930  2854273  2342417  511856  322100  189756  –59174 
2000-01  294796  350376  –55580  150325  –237167  3075484  2567321  508163  339314  168849  –68318 
2001-02  333788  408939  –75151  174192  –249343  3031634  2698992  332642  301207  190531  –58812 
Source:  Estimated from Pakistan Economic Survey and the Annual Reports of the  State Bank of Pakistan (Various Issues) . 
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